Sustainability issues don't normally manifest themselves for decades because either population growth rates or per capita income growth rates are relatively slow. But they become difficult to ignore when that is not the case as in China in the last two decades. China's rapid transformation from an agricultural based economy to the manufacturing workshop of the world has been accompanied by a corresponding change in the spatial concentration and location of the population from relatively low density rural areas to very high density urban areas. This transformation is having a significant impact on the quantity and quality of natural resources available as inputs into the production process and consumption, as well as the ability of the environment to absorb the waste byproducts deposited in the air, water, and soil. The recent acceleration of growth in India is beginning to generate similar problems.
1. What is likely to be the demand for energy-particularly oil and coal-under a businessas-usual (BAU) scenario in China and India in 2020 and up to 2050?
2. What are likely to be the associated levels of emissions that could have damaging consequences at the local level (such as particulate matter), regional level (such as ozone, sulfur and acid rain), and the global level (CO 2 in particular)?
3. What strategic domestic interventions in the development of the energy producing and energy using sectors might make a significant difference in the energy path relative to a business as usual scenario?
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the paper is organized in two parts.
2 Part 1 provides a review of the problems associated with the recent trends in overall energy use and its composition in China and India, with some discussion of the associated trends in local and global emissions. This section also includes a brief discussion of the extent to which energy use in China and India has affected the recent run-up in international energy prices.
The crux of the story in this part is that high growth in the manufacturing sector and of the electricity producing sector in both countries, but particularly in China, is fueling rapid growth in fossil fuel energy use-primarily coal. Even though India is more diversified in energy sources because of its greater reliance on traditional biomass, both countries have limited, cheap domestic energy resources for electricity generation other than coal in the near future. The heavy reliance on coal is associated with the expansion of various types of local pollutants (such as suspended particulate matter, sulfur/SO 2 , etc.) contributing to health problems (with impacts particularly in cities) and acid rain (with impacts particularly in rural areas). Attempts to reduce local emissions in China by curtailing coal production and consumption had some success for a few years in the late 90s. But this decoupling could not be sustained because high growth in the economy was generating power shortages and other dislocations, necessitating the resumption of coal use even if it was inefficiently produced.
The industrial policy decision to support motorization (i.e., greater dependence on automobiles and road transport) because of its multiple linkages to other sectors, has resulted in both countries experiencing a surge in the demand for oil (gasoline, diesel and other oil products). This has resulted in a growth in oil imports with implications for the balance of payments and energy security. The recent rise in global oil prices is partially a result of the growth in energy use in China and India. Together the two of them account for 40 to 50 percent of the increase in the global use of oil since 2001, even though they only account for 9-10 percent of aggregate global use of oil. However, this growth in oil use in China and India has been partially offset by the deceleration or drop in oil use in countries traditionally dependent on oil. As a result, aggregate use of oil has not grown substantially in the last few years relative to the previous few years. But, because of the tightening of oil supplies (due to geo-political problems, insufficient investment in exploration, etc.) the inventory model of price forecasting no longer works. In fact, international prices are growing far faster than can be explained by demand increases alone, indicating the presence of supply constraints and increased uncertainty.
Part 2 describes a couple of scenarios for the trajectory of energy and emissions in China and India up to 2050. The reference case is designated as a business as usual scenario (BAU) with a high growth variant (BAU-H). These are compared with a set of alternate scenarios (ALT) based on interventions on the demand and supply side of energy use which result in substantially more energy efficiency and lower global and local emissions relative to the BAU cases. The underlying assumptions of these scenarios are provided as well as their implications for global energy markets (including energy prices) and global emissions under different assumptions on the presence or absence of rigidities in energy markets. Potential feedback effects on national and global GDP growth rates are also discussed briefly. This section also includes some rough estimates of the investment requirements of the different scenarios and implications for additional financing if growth constraints are to be avoided.
The crux of the story is that to improve welfare of its citizens and generate a steady stream of employment to accommodate the growing labor force, both China and India will have to maintain high GDP growth rates for many decades. With the demographic shift of the population to urban areas and the growing per capita income of the urban population, the demand for electricity will be increasingly rapidly. At present, the most abundant and cheapest domestic fuel source for electricity production in both China and India is coal. There will also be a growing demand for mobility in both countries which is likely to be increasingly satisfied through growing road and air traffic-both heavy consumers of oil.
Thus, the two business as usual scenarios (BAU) presuppose heavy reliance on fossil fuels for the next couple of decades with adverse consequences for local emissions (suspended particulates, sulfur, ozone, etc.), as well as global emissions (greenhouse gases-particularly CO 2 ). The reference BAU scenario assumes annual growth rates of 6-7 percent in China and 5-6 percent scenarios in India over the next decade tapering to 3 percent and 4 percent respectively by 2050. The high growth rate scenarios (8-9 percent per annum in China and 7-8 percent per annum in India) are based on recent performance and extrapolation of government assumptions for upcoming five-year plans. These BAU scenarios will put pressure on international energy markets-particularly if there are rigidities in the rate at which supply can expand (because of uncertainties regarding the returns to investment-for example in oil refineries etc.-and the increased reliance on high-cost alternate sources for oil-such as tar sands, etc.). The higher world energy prices will have repercussions on China and India resulting in some reallocation of investment away from higher productivity non-energy sectors but also the growth of less energyintensive sectors. The impact of higher world energy prices on other parts of the world will be mixed. Growth rates will be adversely affected by higher prices, but these will be partially or fully offset by growing exports to the larger markets in rapidly growing China and India-particularly in the high growth rate scenarios.
The alternate, policy-based scenarios (ALT) are designed to explore the extent of two potential decouplings. First, decoupling energy growth from GDP growth through a combination of reduced energy intensity (structural shifts away from manufacturing) and increased energy efficiency. Second, decoupling emissions growth from energy growth through fuel switching from coal to gas (or clean coal), or from fossil fuels to nuclear energy or renewables. Traditionally, the presumption is that the higher cost of investment in alternatives to fossil fuels will be prohibitive and therefore best delayed till technological innovations reduce their costs to avoid adversely affecting GDP growth rates. The cumulative financial cost reducing benefit of this delayed investment, however, may be offset by the increased cumulative emissions cost associated with prolonged reliance on fossil fuels. In the IMACLIM model used for the simulations in this paper, "learning by doing" is built-in; therefore earlier investments in novel technologies will accelerate the rate at which one moves down the cost curve thereby reducing the aggregate financial burden. In the reference case, as well as scenarios with rigidities in adjustment in global (local) energy markets, some external financing becomes necessary if growth rates are not to be adversely affected in China and India. However, in the high growth rate scenario, enough savings are generated (particularly in China, less so in India) to potentially self finance a larger part of the higher cost of investment in energy efficiency and the shift away from carbon based fuels.
The Level and Composition of Energy Use and Emissions in China and India

Emerging Concerns
Demand for Fossil Fuel Energy Is Exceeding Domestic Supply Capabilities
Currently, at the aggregate level China and India consume about 12 and 5 percent of the world's energy, respectively. In terms of composition, China's consumption of coal is slightly less than its production of coal-the balance being exported (figure 5.1 and table 5A.1). On the other hand, China's consumption of petroleum is increasingly larger than its production-the balance being imported (figure 5.1 and table 5A.1). For most other fuels, domestic consumption and production are still roughly in balance (see table 5A.1). India's domestic production of coal and oil satisfies an even smaller part of its consumption and the imbalance is growing-particularly in oil (figure 5.2). Both countries produce gas but gas consumption does not yet account for a significant part of energy use. As of the present, China is the second-largest energy consumer in the world following the U.S. Its total energy use, however, is still only half that of the U.S., and its per capita consumption levels are only about 10 percent of that in the U.S.
3 Because China's population is more than four times the size of the population in the U.S., China's per capita energy consumption level has only to double (i.e., increase to 23 percent of the U.S. level) for it to become the world's largest consumer of energy.
High growth in the electricity producing sectors in both countries, and of manufacturing in China, is fueling rapid growth in fossil fuel energy use. Even though India is more diversified in energy sources because of its reliance on biomass, both countries have limited, cheap domestic energy resources for electricity generation other than coal in the near future. The rapid growth in transportation (motorization and aviation) is fuelling the accelerated use of oil in both countries.
Limited Low-Cost Domestic Energy Resources Other Than Coal for the Production of Electricity
Traditionally, the industrial sector has accounted for over 75 percent of China's final energy consumption (World Bank 2001b) . In 1980 China had one of the highest energy intensities 4 in the world using GDP at market prices (see table 5.1)-almost 7 times as high as the US and almost four times as high as in India. Using purchasing power parity figures lowers the relationship vis-à-vis the US from 6.7 to 1.8, but increases it relative to India from 3.8 to 4.9. In the 23 year period from 1980 to 2003 energy intensity in China declined by an extraordinary 4.8 percent per annum 5 -more than double the 2 percent per annum decline in the US and almost 24 times faster than the anemic 0.2 percent per annum decline in India. As a result, China's energy intensity dropped by half relative to the US, while India's increased by 50 percent relative to US. This significant pattern of change over more than two decades (both within the two countries, as well as, relative to the US) is independent of the use of GDP at market prices or purchasing power prices (see last row of table 5.1). China's use of electricity more than doubled in the decade between 1986 and 1995. China has the fastest growing electric power industry in the world-fueled primarily by coal. Hydroelectric generating capacity is a particularly important source of electric power in the central and western regions. India has an installed electricity generation capacity of 112,000 MW which is about 10 percent that of the U.S. (EIA 2003a) . Approximately 70 percent of India's electricity comes from coal. Industry is the largest consumer of electricity, followed by the agricultural and residential sectors. As in the case of China, India's power sector continues to face a considerable demand-supply gap as well as poor quality of supply (low voltage and grid instability). Peak shortage in power is estimated in the range of 13 percent (MoP, 2003) , even though the peak is probably lower than it would have been with more reliable supply. Transmission and distribution (T&D) losses 6 in some states (that is, Maharashtra) amount to around 40 percent of total electricity generated centrally.
Strategic/Security Concerns over Growing Oil Imports for Transportation
In China, deficiencies in existing oil pipeline infrastructure to link the remote hinterland to the primary centers of demand in the rapidly industrializing coastal regions meant that economic 5 Most of the reduction in energy intensity in China since 1978 is attributed to technological change, not structural shifts from heavy to light industry (Lin, 1996) . 6 The losses can be of a technical nature such as line losses due to poor maintenance, overloading, poor standards of equipment, low power factors at off peak hours etc. or of a commercial nature such as illegal tapping of low tension lines, faulty energy meters/unmetered supply, and uneven revenue collection. Some of the problems with loss reduction are lack of energy audits, lack of segregation of losses into technical and commercial losses and lack of transparency in meter reading and billing. Available data cited does not distinguish between the two even though the commercial losses, such as theft, are a loss to the utility but not to power consumption. agents in these centers found it cheaper to import fuel oil and diesel from abroad than to rely on domestic sourcing of oil and oil products even when the country was a net exporter of oil.
In addition, in the last decade China has committed itself to a strategy of emulating the U.S.'s dependence on motorization as the dominant mode of transportation. This strategy was only in part determined by mobility considerations. It was primarily driven by industrial policy considerations. 7 The automobile industry is seen as a potential engine of growth for the economy as a whole because of its multiplier effect through buyer-supplier linkages.
This strategy shift has seen less energy-intensive vehicles, such as bicycles and pedi-cabs, replaced by more energy-intensive vehicles, such as motorcycles, cars and trucks. The rate of growth of the vehicle fleet-which averaged 5.7 percent per annum through 1999-accelerated dramatically to 26.5 percent per annum in the last five years, though there are now signs that the growth rate is beginning to moderate. Automobile ownership in China is still only eight to ten per thousand people, in contrast to the ~400 per thousand people in Japan, and the ~500 per thousand people in the U.S. 8 However, a tenfold growth in ownership of automobiles over the next 30 years in China is quite conceivable given the expected growth in household incomes and current government policies. The average number of vehicle miles traveled per household and the volume of freight transported by truck traffic is also expected to expand dramatically: within urban areas, as urban sprawl increases and jobs and residences move increasingly to lower-cost suburbs-but not in tandem; and between urban centers, as commercial and industrial entities rely increasingly on the flexibility provided by the growing highway network (relative to railways) linking China's cities, and the coasts to the hinterlands. The penetration of fuel efficient hybrid technology in the vehicle fleet is still very low.
Some cities in India, such as Delhi, have exhibited similar explosive growth in automobile ownership and use as China. However, overall, the reliance on the road sector for passenger and commercial traffic is much lower in India because it started much later. But the recent growth of the middle class in India, and the government's decision to dramatically expand the highway network is likely to fuel a growing dependence on the road sector. Both China and India have also seen an explosive growth in air traffic which is also a major consumer of oil products.
Energy Use and Fossil Fuel Emissions in China and India in the Period 1980-2004
China is the largest producer of coal in the world. By 1995 its production was already 50 percent above that in the U.S. (1.5 billion short tons versus one billion short tons) (EIA 1997). China's estimated total coal resources are second only to the former Soviet Union although proven reserves ranked third in the world. China is a net exporter of coal and likely to remain so for at least another decade.
In 2003, coal accounted for 67 percent of China's primary energy production of 1,216 Mtoe, oil for 12 percent, natural gas for 3 percent, hydro for 2 percent, and biomass and other waste for 16 percent (table 5A.1). China has a growing nuclear power sector, but its output accounts for less than one percent (0.8 percent) of energy production in 2003. More recently, China has moved aggressively to expand nuclear, wind and solar power generating capacity, as well as new technologies for coal gasification, etc. In final energy consumption coal also dominates other energy resources, accounting for 72 percent of fossil fuel consumption, and 58 percent of total primary energy use (figure 5.3). In 2003, India's total primary energy production was estimated at 441 Mtoe, with coal accounting for 36 percent of the supply mix, oil for 9 percent, gas for 5 percent, hydro for 1 percent, nuclear for 1 percent, and biomass energy and other renewable for 48 percent (table 5A.1).
9 India is relatively abundant in both exhaustible and renewable energy resources. Over the years, there has been a significant increase in commercial fuels. As figure 5 .4 indicates, use of coal and oil is growing rapidly in tune with the economic expansion. Nonetheless, more than 60 percent of the Indian households still depend on traditional energy sources such as fuelwood, dung, and crop residue for their energy requirements (TERI, 2004) .
The increasing use of fossil fuels (particularly coal and oil) in both countries, is also generating harmful emissions-particulates (with primarily local effects on health in urban areas), sulfur and nitrogen (with primarily a regional effect via ozone and acid rain on agriculture and ecosystems), and CO 2 (with primarily a global effect via carbon on global warming) 
Global Externalities-China Is on Track to Become the World's Largest Emitter of Greenhouse Gases, with India as the Next Largest Emitter among Developing Countries
Currently the U.S. is the world's largest emitter of carbon emissions from energy. However, China is expected to overtake the U.S. in the next decade plus. China's carbon emissions are driven by the rapid growth in the use of fossil fuels-particularly coal and oil (gas not being a significant contributor yet). CO 2 emissions from India are a quarter of those from China, but also growing due to the dependence on fossil fuels, particularly for electricity production. As evident in figure 5.5, CO 2 emissions in both countries track coal use quite closely.
What are the socio-economic factors driving CO 2 emission changes in China and India? Recent literature covering the period 1980-96/97 (see tables 5.2 and 5.3) suggests that economic growth was the single largest driver of increased emissions in both countries. 10 The gross emission increases have been significantly offset by improved energy efficiency in China, but much less so in India (this point was made earlier in the discussion on energy intensity in the two countries). Decarbonization, i.e. lowering CO 2 emissions by reducing the emission factor (through use of better technology) and penetration of lower carbon fuels, was not a significant factor during this two decade period. However, its importance has increased in the '90s in India. Sources: Sinton et al. 1998 ; Van Vuurena et al. 2003; and Zhang 2000. As noted earlier, not only is heavy reliance on fossil fuel (particularly coal) associated with the expansion of CO 2 , it is also associated with the expansion of various types of local pollutants (such as suspended particulate matter, sulfur/SO 2 , NOx, etc.) contributing to health problems-with impacts particularly in cities, and ozone 11 and acid rain-with impacts particularly in rural areas and natural ecosystems.
China's State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) estimates that "industrial pollution accounts for over 70 percent of the national total, including 72 percent for sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions, and 75 percent for flue dust (a major component of suspended particulates)". Similar problems are also occurring in India.
Sulfur dioxide and soot released by coal combustion are the two major air pollutants, resulting in acid rain, which now falls on about 30 percent of China's total land area (EIA 2003c)-areas which are also affected by an ozone generated natural haze. In India too, acidic precipitation is becoming increasingly common. According to the Environmental Information System of India, soils in the northeast region, parts of Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal and coastal areas in the south already have a low pH value. If immediate mitigative measures are not taken, further aggravation from acid rain may cause these lands to become infertile or unsuitable for agriculture. Studies in India show decrease in mean wheat yield of 13 to 50 percent within 10 km of thermal power stations of capacity 500 to 2000 MW respectively (Mitra and Sharma, 2002) . Similar studies in China have concluded that the deteriorating air quality has reduced optimal yield by 5-30 percent for about 70 percent of the crops grown there (Chameides et al, 1999) .
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Industrial boilers and furnaces based on coal are the largest single point sources of urban air pollution, and road transport the main mobile source of air pollution. Depending on what pollutant one focuses on, a different set of 10-20 cities are amongst the most polluted in the world in terms of air pollution. Many Chinese and Indian cities are amongst these cities (see figure 5.6).
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One can meaningfully talk about pollution in a city, a locality, or a river but not for an area as large as a country-such as the average level of pollution in China or India-because pollution per unit area is a function of localized air sheds and watersheds. Instead it is more useful at the country level to estimate the total number of people exposed to different levels and types of pollution.
In 2003, over half (58.4 percent) of the urban population in China was exposed to average annual PM10 in excess of 100 micrograms per cubic meter, which is the Chinese standard (and twice the U.S. standard). Air pollution is estimated to have led to over 427,000 excess deaths and 300,000 cases of chronic bronchitis in 660 Chinese cities in that year (World Bank, 2006a) . In the case of India, Cohen et al (2004) report an estimate of 107,000 excess deaths in 2000. 14 11 Ozone and other photochemical oxidants are formed by the action of ultra-violet (UV) light from the sun on nitrogen. Its production and concentration is dependent on the presence of NOx and ultra-violet light. 12 Assuming sufficient water and nutrients, simulations of the crop-response models demonstrate that atmospheric aerosols lead to lower crop yields through a decrease in total surface solar irradiance-thereby affecting the marginal productivity of other inputs. 13 Earlier studies include the report released in 1998 by the World Health Organization (WHO). 14 Other partial studies corroborate these findings. In China, the consequences of current air pollution levels are apparent in public health statistics for some cities: "approximately 4,000 people suffer premature death from pollutionrelated respiratory illness each year in Chongqing; 4,000 in Beijing; and 1,000 in both Shanghai and Shenyang. If current trends persist, Beijing could lose nearly 80,000 people, Chongqing 70,000, and other major cities could suffer tens of thousands in cumulative loss of human life through 2020. With industry expected to maintain rapid growth Attempts to reduce local emissions in China by curtailing coal production and consumption had some success in reducing local emissions (see figure 5.7) for a few years in the late 1990s. This tracked the apparent dip in coal consumption in China (see figure 5.5). Even though GDP grew by a third (+33.7 percent) in the period 1997-2001, there was almost no increase in CO 2 emissions (+0.2 percent)-as opposed to a 14 percent increase that would have been expected based on emissions to GDP relations in the period 1980 to 1997. This gave rise to much optimism regarding the potential for 'decoupling' the growth in energy requirements from the growth. Several factors explain this apparent decoupling. Their relative weight is still being debated. But there is a consensus that the closing of a large number of small and inefficient coal producers was a key factor in this decoupling (Sinton and Fridley, 2000, 2003; Sinton, 2001) .
But this decoupling could not be sustained. In the presence of low power tariffs, blackouts, and power shortages arising from 9-10 percent per annum GDP growth, it has been necessary to use all power generating capacity, no matter how inefficient. during the next 20 years, a steep decline in pollution intensity will be necessary just to keep emissions constant" ( Dasgupta et al, 1997) . In India, Delhi has been identified as the city having the highest mortality figure of about 7,500 deaths per annum. (Brandon and Hommann, 1995; WHO, 2002; World Bank 2005b 
Energy Use in China and India and International Energy Markets
The decision to encourage more reliance on roads for passenger and freight movements has resulted in both countries experiencing a surge in the demand for oil (gasoline, diesel and other oil products). This has resulted in the growth of oil imports with national implications for balance of payments and energy security, and global implications for world energy markets. This section is limited to discussing the latter issue and argues that the recent growth in energy use in China and India does account for a significant part of the incremental increase in global energy use, but that the annual growth in global energy use has not been unusual relative to the past and as such is not the key component in the recent surge in oil prices. It is the tightening of oil supplies in the context of growing geopolitical uncertainties that is driving the increase in oil prices.
Since the late 1980s nominal oil prices 15 have been relatively stable and flat. There were two exceptions: a momentary spike (reflecting uncertainty) during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 with prices soaring +50 percent above the May 1990-91 average. And a longer-lasting perturbation during the Asian crisis of 1997-98 (when prices dropped by some US$12.9 between January 1997 and December 1998). The latter was primarily a negative demand shock, caused mostly by the decline in oil demand in Asia, and the modest slow-down of economic activity in Europe and Japan. But it also included a lag in OPEC's adjustment of its production downward. Together China and India account for a large portion (40-50 percent) of the incremental increase in global oil use (see figure 5.8), even though they only account for 9-10 percent of aggregate global oil use. However, this recent growth in oil use in China and India has been partially offset by the deceleration or drop in the use of oil in countries traditionally dependent on oil (see figure 5.8). As a result, aggregate use of oil has not grown as dramatically in the last few years as it did in the 1990s.
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Until early 2005, the supply of oil (and draw-down of inventories) has been able to more or less keep up with the rising demand. But since then, the market has entered a situation of extreme tightness. As a result, many short-term developments and problems all along the supply chain, 20 which were not a concern in a period of ample stocks, have been magnified putting upward pressure on prices and contributing to its high volatility. Figure 5 .9 shows that OPEC spare production capacity started dropping steadily since mid-2002, bringing the market closer to binding constraints on the supply of cheap oil. Since Jan 2004 this spare capacity has been below 3 mbd. Rough calculations by the IMF suggest that a level of spare capacity on the order of 5 20 Inadequate investment in refining capacity over the last decade (combined with the refinery damage associated with hurricanes in the Gulf of Texas) has also been a constraint. mbd may help stabilize the market by reducing volatility by 50 percent (IMF 2005) . With geopolitical uncertainties associated with output from Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela (see light grey part of the bars in figure 5.9), and underinvestment (both up and downstream) in the supply chain, the extent of the drop in spare capacity is even higher. Consequently, with the tightening of oil supplies, the inventory model of price forecasting 21 no longer works. It is interesting to note that between mid 2003 and mid-2004 when the balance between demand and supply was relatively comfortable, prices continued to increase significantly. Even after OPEC adopted an accommodative stance from mid-2004 onwards-to allow OECD commercial crude oil stocks to be fully replenished and to ease the potential fear of supply shortages in the context of a slowdown of non-OPEC production-the upward movement of prices has not been slowed down. Supply and demand equilibrium-as captured in the inventory model of the oil market-has ceased to fully predict crude oil prices in the last few years (see figure 5.10). 21 The so-called inventory model focuses tracking down the dynamics of production, consumption and stock fluctuation, and its relationship to inventory movements to explain the evolution of prices of a commodity. In the context of the oil market, oil stocks levels (including strategic reserves) in OECD countries have indeed been shown to be highly correlated to oil prices (Merino and Ortiz, 2005) . The inventory model can be applied to the oil market for short-term forecasting purposes (Ye et al., 2005) or for heuristic purposes to disentangle the relative weight of different factors involved in price formation (Pindyck, 2001; Merino and Ortiz, 2005) . It is difficult in this context, to assign a very large weight to the impact of the growth of oil use in China and India on international oil prices. The acceleration of demand for oil, particularly in China (less so in India), could be characterized as a demand shock. But at best it is a shock that is displacing demand from other sources in the context of supply constraints. There has been no acceleration in the global use of crude oil in the last decade (see figure 5.11). But there has been a dramatic acceleration in prices in the last two years. What has been argued in the paragraphs above is that supply is much more inelastic now than it has been in the past because of the decline in spare capacity. This, combined with increased geopolitical uncertainties, is a key factor in recent price increases. Prices are currently being formed in a setting increasingly driven by expectations of future tightness in the market fuelled by concerns regarding medium-term prospects for cheap energy supplies such as:
1. the slowdown of growth in non-OPEC production (despite high oil prices), which is expected to peak in about 5-10 years, 2. the erosion of (OPEC) spare production capacity noted above, which is already under the pressure from increasing social unrest and political developments, inadequate spending on exploration and the maintenance of existing oil fields, and the shortage of appropriate refinery capacities in the context of a re-specification of demand, causing an extra pressure on demand for lighter products.
Simulation of Energy and Emissions Trajectories in China and India up to 2050
Both China and India will have to maintain high GDP growth rates for many decades to improve welfare of their citizens and generate a steady stream of employment to accommodate the growing labor force. This growth will be fuelled by energy. Many analysts of energy use in China and India note that China and India's own production of fossil fuel energy is not likely to grow at the same high rate as use of fossil fuel energy. As a result, they are expected to become increasingly dependent on energy imports. How dependent, will be a function of whether they stay with current low cost but polluting energy options, or move aggressively to adopt a new, more balanced and diversified energy strategy-which is explored in this section.
In forecasting energy use in the medium term (up to 5 years) it is common to take GDP growth and its underlying structure as exogenously determined, and use an econometrically estimated elasticity of energy use with respect to GDP to determine likely energy use. This parameter tends to have a value substantially less than unity for most high income OECD countries (specially since the 1970s, when they started shifting to a post-industrial service-based economic structure-in part as a reaction to oil price shocks) and close to or greater than unity for most developing countries (Zhang 2000) . In the 1990s, however, this parameter had a value of 0.7-0.8 for India-substantially lower than in the 1970s. This parameter, has been even less stable for economies undergoing substantial structural changes such as in China-where it has varied from under 0.5 to over 1.0.
22 In fact, reliance on these extra low numbers for China in the 1990s caused IEA and other observers of the China scene to dramatically underestimate energy demand in China in the post 2000 period 23 (IEA 2002) . Based on more recent economic and energy statistics (for 2002-2004) , China is again exhibiting developing country patterns of energy demand growth with an energy elasticity of GDP closer to one.
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To go beyond estimating aggregate energy needs within a five-year period requires use of more complicated models. To differentiate growth in different energy categories (for example, fossil fuel versus renewables, or subcategories of each) a more disaggregated model of the economy is required that provides structural detail on the energy sector and how that responds to relative prices, changes in the productivity of different sectors, etc. This requires a multi-sectoral simulation model. Many energy simulation models have a 20 to 30 year horizon because the underlying capital stock for energy production is long-lasting and long-term implications of current investments do not show up in shorter horizons. Even longer horizons are required to analyze the consequence of current investments for future emissions. The externalities associated with some energy related emissions are a function of the concentration of long-lasting pollutants, such as CO 2 . This requires models with horizons of at least 50 years, 25 which is what we use in this section.
Choice of Simulation Models
In simulating energy and emissions for individual countries some analysts rely on top-down economy wide models, while others rely on bottom-up sectoral models. The former tend to generate a lot of trade-offs because they presume that all sectors are operating at their production frontiers. The latter tend to generate more win-win opportunities, but do not adequately take into account feedback affects or offsetting effects in the rest of the economy/energy system. As a result, it is increasingly common to use a system of models that are soft-linked 26 (including topdown and general equilibrium economy wide models, as well as bottom-up, partial equilibrium models with more technological and sectoral detail). 22 This anomaly has not yet been satisfactorily explained. It appears to have resulted from a combination of improved efficiency/structural change/fuel switching (low hanging fruit), draconian command economy measures (closing profitable TVEs that were heavily reliant on dirty coal. But a significant part of it could be due to faulty statistics. 23 In IEA's World Energy Outlook 2002, the projected total primary energy demand in China for 2010 is 1,302 Mtoe, while this demand had reached 1422 Mtoe in 2003 already. 24 Total energy demand elasticity over the period 1990-2003, excluding 1997-1999 , averaged around 0.6, based on energy and GDP data from IEA and WDI respectively. 25 Most climate change models operate in five-year increments over a couple of centuries. 26 Where the output of one model is fed in as an input into another model instead of establishing a single set of internally consistent equations in a more comprehensive model.
To simultaneously simulate developments in China and India and the global consequences for different energy markets as well as global emissions, analysts rely on multi-regional global models. A number of such multiregional global models are available. This section uses estimates generated by the IMACLIM-R model at C.I.R.E.D.
The IMACLIM-R model is a general equilibrium model with sub-sector detail on the energy producing sectors (such as fossil fuels-coal, oil and gas-and non fossil fuels-nuclear, hydro, biomass and other renewables), energy transforming sectors (such as electricity), and key energy using sectors (such as industry, construction, transportation, and the residential sector). All other sectors are collapsed into an aggregate composite sector for ease of analysis. Growth is partly exogenously determined (population, savings), and partly endogenously determined (endogenous productivity growth, variations in the terms of trade, exhaustion of cheap fossil fuel resources, etc.). Each year a static Walrasian equilibrium is solved and the structural evolution of the economy is endogenized (for example, a scenario in which there is a lot of investment on transportation and in which consumers have a strong preference for mobility, will generate different structural growth over time from a scenario with the opposite assumption).
Compared with other existing economy-energy models, the IMACLIM-R 27 model contains a few advantages:
1. It explicitly incorporates technical information on the demand and supply sides of the energy sectors, including the end-use efficiency (often neglected in models using elasticities applied to final energy demand) and the ability to simulate "learning by doing" and the incorporation of capital stock vintages for long-lasting investments to more realistically trace the path of investment and technological adoption, 2. It ensures consistency between this technical information and the characteristics of the economic context, including the prevailing set of relative prices, 28 3. It is based on a modeling compromise between models generating long-term optimal trajectories under perfect foresight (which tend to underestimate the role of social and technical inertia in economic adjustments) and models generating disequilibrium dynamics with a lot of hysterisis 29 and knife-edge pathways. IMACLIM-R is a growth model that allows transitional disequilibrium. The model has the ability to incorporate shorter-term transitional imbalances (due to the interplay of imperfect foresight at a given point in time and the inertia in the economic system) and the ability to adapt [see point (i)]. But, it also contains all the feedback mechanisms required to enable it over the long run to structurally recover a Solow-like long-term pathway resulting from demographic changes, productivity growth, capital accumulation, and changes in the terms of trade. As such, long-term growth does not depend on inter-temporal optimization with rational expectations, 30 but rather on imperfect foresight about future prices and quantities-which is explicitly modelled for investment allocation and technology choices in the electricity sector. 27 For additional detail see Crassous et al (2006) . 28 The reaction to prices, in IMACLIM-R, is also dependent upon technical information, such as the existence of asymptotes in energy efficiency, which is more credible than constant coefficients of the production function when prices move over a large range. 29 A mechanism that generates large losses in terms of cumulative GDP. 30 Although the model describes behavior in terms of current prices, this does not necessarily signify the absence of expectations. First, it is assumed that people react to existing prices as the best available information at the time decisions are made. Second, the elasticities which govern these reactions are supposed to mimic real behavior and incorporate implicitly a broader set of parameters such as inertia, risk aversion, etc.
4. It allows international capital flows between regions as a function of the divergence between domestic savings and total desired amount of investments in each of 9 global regions (with China and India each representing a separate region). The model is savings-driven. A region's (country's) aggregate savings rate is determined exogenously by long-term demographic trends and age structure rather than short-term interest rate adjustments. All savings are invested. Desired amounts of investment are computed from (imperfectly) expected increases in future demand. There is no reason for the two sides to be balanced within a region. As a result, a region with excess savings becomes a capital exporter, and a region with a deficit of savings to finance its investment needs becomes a capital importer. The international pool gathers the exports of regions with excess savings and reallocates the money to regions with insufficient savings proportional to the total amount of unmet domestic investment needs. This scheme mimics a financial market where regions with insufficient savings introduce policies / create assets that are likely to attract foreign capital from regions with excess savings.
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Choice of Scenarios
A base case designated as the business as usual scenario (BAU) is simulated for this paper. 32 For convenience of exposition only the results of this case are described in detail. All others are presented summarily and in relation to the BAU. The GDP growth rates assumed in the BAU are on average 6.5-7.5 percent per annum in China over the next decade or two, and 5-6 percent per annum in India. These average growth rates for the future are somewhat lower than recent performance because of presumed institutional and technical constraints within the economies-resulting in inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and limiting their ability to sustain very high growth rates for a prolonged period. However, a variant of the BAU is also simulated. Designated as BAU-H, it assumes GDP growth rates approximately 1.0-1.5 percentage points higher per annum for both countries. These more optimistic growth rates are based on recent performance and extrapolation of government assumptions for upcoming fiveyear plans. Both the BAU and BAU-H assume continued heavy reliance on fossil fuels for the next couple of decades with adverse consequences for local emissions (suspended particulates, sulfur, ozone, etc.), as well as global emissions (greenhouse gases-particularly CO 2 ).
The growth rates in the BAU case presume (i) a moderate catching up of average labor productivity of these two countries over this 50 year period with an acceleration in the first two decades; (ii) a gross domestic saving ratio declining gradually from ~39 percent to 18 percent in China and from 25 percent to 18 percent in India in 2050. The more dramatic drop in savings in China reflects its aging population. The higher growth scenario (BAU-H) assumes that labor productivity will grow at a faster rate and that saving rates will not drop as rapidly (21-22 percent for China in 2050 and 20 percent for India).
The alternate policy-based scenarios (ALT) are designed to explore the extent to which a package of policies 33 can result in two potential decouplings: First, decoupling energy growth 31 A region can control the export/ import of capital by maintaining its terms of trade artificially low/high. However such a policy can be implemented in the model only through an exogenous assumption (higher net capital exports are consistent with lower terms of trade). 32 The base year for the projections is 2001 rather than 2005 as in other models used in this book. The reason is that IEA data for country specific energy details (which are used in the IMACLIM simulations) are produced with a lag of a couple of years and it was important to ensure that the economic parameters and energy details used in the simulations were mutually consistent and tested for a year or two out of sample. 33 For more information on policy options see Shalizi (2005) .
from GDP growth through reduced energy intensity either as a result of a structural shift away from manufacturing in economic activity, and/or increased energy efficiency. Second, decoupling emissions growth from energy growth through fuel switching from coal to gas (or clean coal), or from fossil fuels to nuclear energy or renewables (and associated simultaneous improvements in energy efficiency). The decouplings are not themselves policies nor are they totally independent of each other. Rather they are an analytically convenient way of describing the extent to which the policies have been effective in increasing the economy's energy efficiency and reducing its reliance on fossil fuels. Three sets of policy scenarios are simulated:
• Demand-side scenarios (designated with a D) that include actions geared towards improvement of end-use efficiency/energy saving, 34 such as (1) a 25 percent improvement in overall energy efficiency in the "composite" sector (including both 'pure efficiency' and structural change in the economy with an increase in the share of services in GDP) relative to the base case, (2) an additional 1.1 percent per annum efficiency gain in residential/household energy using equipment-leading to an eventual 60 percent improvement relative to the baseline, and (3) a 50 percent improvement in the fuelefficiency of cars by 2050 compared to the base case.
• Supply-side scenarios (designated with an S) that include a higher share of hydroelectricity and nuclear in both India and China-hydro capacities are increased by 20 percent relative to the base case, and the share of nuclear power in new investments for power generation is increased to 30 percent. The share of biofuels is progressively increased to 10 percent of the total amount of fuels produced by China and India. The share of wind and solar energy increase significantly from a very low base 35 but not enough to offset the reduction in the use of traditional biomass. Energy efficiency is also increased by 15 percent in the use of coal for industry and by 8 percent in the use of coal for electricity generation in new capital stock installed after 2005.
• Supply and demand side scenarios (designated with an S&D) that combine the two sets of actions. They thus combine efficiency improvements and fuel-switching measures and are in line with Chinese and Indian energy strategies. (Sarma et al, 1998; Liu, 2003) .
The BAU and ALT scenarios are each simulated in two different contexts: (a) the base case used for reference purposes (i.e., BAU and BAU-H) which assumes, perhaps unrealistically, that there are no constraints to adjusting to short term signals on energy markets (i.e., there is no barrier/friction/rigidity that might constrain timely adjustment of prices and quantities within China and India, or internationally); and (b) where there are constraints to timely adjustment-either (i) on the deployment of domestic coal supply in India and China, or (ii) on the evolution of future oil and gas markets, due to unexpected geopolitical or resource shocks in the global oil markets, or due to difficulties of the world oil and gas industry (including refineries) in developing the necessary production capacities in time. This second, perhaps more realistic, set of scenarios are designated with the subscript f for friction (i.e., scenarios BAU-f and BAU-H-f). 34 The IEA suggests that end use efficiency improvements are the source of the greatest potential in managing energy demand and mitigation of CO 2 emissions. Over the 2002-2030 period, improvements in end-use efficiency could contribute to more than 50 percent in the reduction in emissions (see Bradley, 2006) . 35 As noted earlier fuel switching is often also accompanied by simultaneous improvements in energy efficiency.
Whether the energy demand in China or India will put pressure on international fossil-fuel energy markets and the price of energy depends upon:
• the volume of fossil fuel (particularly oil and gas) imports by China and India-which will be determined by the pace and energy structure of their economic growth, and by the nature and actual efficiency of their policies and institutional capacity to promote domestic energy supply,
• the nature of the overall imbalances in international energy markets, given that these imbalances can arise either from the fundamentals of the oil and gas markets (such as inadequacy of investment in refining or transporting capacity), or as a result of shocks caused by geopolitical tensions.
These different scenarios generate a series of outcomes that can be compared. The particular outcomes of interest in this study are: the energy requirements in the economy, the global emissions associated with these energy requirements (focused on CO 2 ), the local emissions associated with these the energy requirements (focused on TSP and SO 2 ), and investment requirements associated with the different energy trajectories. These simulations allow us to also compare the consequences of accelerated or delayed investments in shifting from the base case (BAU) to additional policy actions (ALT) scenarios, and explore the potential for self financing versus additional external financing requirements that might be needed.
BAU Scenarios
In the BAU "No Surprise" and "No Friction" Case (Scenarios BAU and BAU-H) 
Country Implications
In China, in terms of key energy using sectors, industry and services account for the largest share of final energy use over the study period increasing for the next two decades to over 60 percent before declining to below current shares by 2050, the share of residential use also declines from 31 percent to 25 percent, while the share of transportation (relying almost exclusively on refined petroleum products) doubles in the period to 20 percent. In terms of fuels, electricity represents an increasing proportion of final energy use-with its share almost tripling, the shares of gas and refined petroleum products increase by two percentage points each, the shares of coal and traditional biomass drop substantially. The role of coal in final energy use declines as services grow relative to industry, and the role of traditional biomass in final energy use diminishes as commercial electricity replaces it.
Though electricity represents roughly only one third of final energy use by 2050, the heavy reliance on coal (80 percent) for power generation at the mid-century explains why coal retains a prominent share in China's energy balance. By 2050, China's reliance on coal for primary energy use still remains high (63 percent in the BAU scenario and 65 percent in the BAU-H scenario). Primary energy use (not final energy use) determines the extent of polluting emissions. In the BAU scenario, primary energy demand will double in the 20 year period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [2017] [2018] [2019] [2020] 36 for China and by 2050 it will quadruple for China, whereas in the BAU-H, there will be a 2.5 fold increase by 2020 and 5.2 fold increase by 2050. As a result, CO 2 emissions from energy use more than double by 2020 and reach 3.6 GtC by 2050 in China (4.9 GtC in the HG case).
In India, final energy demand from industry and service grows from 33 percent to 48 percent of final energy demand, essentially through an expansion of electricity demand (a consequence of a tertiary sector oriented development). By contrast, final energy demand from the residential sector drops from 57 percent to 36 percent-essentially as a consequence of abandoning traditional biomass for commercial electricity. Transportation-once again, heavily oil dependent-rises from 10 percent to 16 percent of final energy demand.
Similar to the Chinese situation, the switch to electricity increases the share of coal in primary energy demand (though the share of gas in power generation-roughly 4.5 percent-is much more important than in China), specially because coal's share expands relative to hydropower and biomass. In India, dependency on coal will have grown (its share increasing from one third in 2001 to almost 58 percent in 2050). In the BAU scenario, there will be a 1.6 fold increase in primary energy demand in India for the 20-year period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [2017] [2018] [2019] [2020] 37 and by 2050 the increase will be 3.8-fold, whereas in the BAU-H scenario the increases will be 2.2 and 7.9 fold in the two periods respectively. As a result, CO 2 emissions from energy use almost double by 2020 and reach 1.6 GtC in India by 2050 (3.2 GtC in the HG case).
Comparing the BAU and BAU-H scenarios leads to the unsurprising result that energy demand and CO 2 emissions will be higher, the higher the rate of growth of GDP. More interestingly, the advantage of using the longer 50 year time horizon becomes apparent. Because CO 2 persists in the atmosphere for very long periods it is the concentrations not annual emissions that matter for purposes of analyzing rising temperatures and global warming. If the analysis were restricted only to the period 2020, we would see that CO 2 emissions from energy use in China are only + 7 percent higher and in India 37 percent higher in the high growth BAU-H case relative to the BAU case. But by 2050 the differences are dramatic. 37 percent higher in China and 100 percent higher in India. Cumulatively, over the 50 year period, the higher growth case generates 22 percent more CO 2 emissions in China and 34 percent in India relative to the BAU case. 
Global Implications
At present, China accounts for 6 percent of world oil use; this share rises to 11 percent in 2050 in the BAU case (vs. 14 percent in the BAU-H case). Note that the share of China's oil consumption in total world oil consumption stabilizes after 2030 because oil use in other developing countries grows faster. In the same period India's global share increases steadily from 3 percent to 5 percent in the BAU case (vs. 8 percent in BAU-H case). Both Chinese and Indian increases in crude oil use are significant but not enough to cause large difficulties at the global level under the assumption of "no surprise" and "no friction" (i.e., there is no tightness in the oil market, or alternately appropriate decisions are taken in a timely manner in the world oil industry to avoid supply bottlenecks). . This is a significant increase but it is not outlandish relative to historical experience. 39 It is only double current prices of ~$75/bl. But as noted earlier this may not be a steady-state price. Going back further in time, the price of a barrel of oil in 1970 was only $9.0 in constant 2004 dollars (or $1.8 in nominal prices of 1970). 40 In 2004, before the recent spike in oil prices as a result of tightness in the oil market and geopolitical uncertainties, the price was $36.4-i.e., a fourfold increase in a little more than three decades. 41 Is it plausible that alternate fuel technologies will not displace demand for oil at such high prices?. This cannot be answered definitively. The growth in oil prices by 2050 is driven by the continuing growth in the demand for mobility (particularly road and air transportation) all over the world. This generates substantial growth in the use of oil for which there will still be few substitutes-unlike in the power sector where there are many renewable alternatives to fossil fuels. In simulating the model the market penetration of biofuels or hydrogen as alternatives to oil for transport is assumed to be limited in the time period under review. 42 With the exception of ethanol from sugarcane (and to a lesser extent from corn) all other biofuels are at early stages of research and experimentation. Hydrogen and coal liquification are not yet commercially viable technologies and may not be so for another you decade or two, and it will take another couple of decades before the necessary infrastructure can be put into place to allow a substantial part of the fleet to be converted to the use of these alternate fuels. As a result, relying on knowledge of currently practical or likely to be practical technologies within the next two decades the simulation clearly shows that the upward trend in oil prices will continue, linked to supply conditions.
43
Because of the adaptation built into the model a gradual price increase does not generate a significant loss in GDP, whereas a spike in oil prices (Hamilton, 2003) , will generate significant losses in GDP-at least in the short run, when the economy does not have the requisite ability to adjust. Over time the economy returns to its long-run trajectory. As noted by Manne (1978) , if there is either perfect expectations or progressive adaptation over the long run in a world with no erratic shocks, then since energy is a small fraction of the economy, one cannot expect large GDP variations. This is no longer the case when there are shocks and surprises. As noted earlier, the "no surprise" and "no friction" BAU configuration may not be a realistic assumption, however, it provides a useful benchmark against which to evaluate the case in which there is rigidity and friction (i.e., prices and quantities do not adjust rapidly and smoothly). 44 To analyze the behavior of IMACLIM in response to a spike in oil prices a simulation was run assuming a US$35 / bl increase in world oil prices over two years relative to the long-term price trajectory. At the peak, GDP losses reach -3.2 percent in China (-1.6 percent in two consecutive years) and -7 percent in India (-3.5 percent in two consecutive years).
40 BP(2006) . 41 The 1970 price for Arab light crude was even less at $1.26 in current prices equivalent to $7 in 2005 prices. In 2003, its price was $40 or five times as much (IEA, 2006) . 42 As noted in the discussion on supply measures implemented in the model biofuel penetration is assumed to reach 10 percent of fuels in China and India. For the world as a whole the penetration rate is even lower at 3 percent of fuels over the next 50 years based on WEO (IEA, 2004) . 43 Note that this oil price profile already incorporates an increasing role for non-conventional, more expensive petroleum sources. 44 In the BAU-H scenario oil prices are higher than in the BAU scenario but not by much-the difference being only US$6.8/bl (+5.1 percent) higher in 2050 compared to the BAU case. The reason for this minimal difference is that, by construction of the scenario energy policies are deployed in a timely and efficient manner in the coal sector in China and India to meet their growing energy needs. The rise in transportation demand for oil is significant but not enough to generate drastic imbalances on the oil market. In the business as usual case with high GDP growth rates for China and India (BAU-H), the rest of the world experiences a 2 percent higher GDP relative to the BAU scenario, induced by the faster economic growth in the Asian Giants. This results in a 16 percent increase in global primary energy requirements. The price of oil increases only marginally by $6.8 relative to the BAU case of $133. Carbon emissions, however, increased by 19.8 percent by 2050. This faster growth in carbon emissions relative to primary energy reflects a 5.3 percent increase in the carbon content of the world aggregate energy supply because most of the regions in the world are not able to avoid a higher use of coal and other fossil fuels to meet their higher energy demand. The cumulative emissions over the period rise by 34 percent. Together, India and China account for 60 percent of world total emission by 2050 (relative to 44 percent in the BAU case).
The overall conclusion is that higher growth of energy use in China and India is not likely, alone, to cause structural imbalances in international energy markets. The main negative outcomes are in terms of local and global (CO 2 ) emissions, and, beyond 2050 in terms of the acceleration of the exhaustion of overall reserves of conventional and non-conventional oil.
In the BAU Case Where There Are Rigidities and Frictions in the Deployment of Coal Capacities in China and India, and Oil and Gas Capacity Internationally (BAU-f and BAU-H-f)
This second set of simulations examine whether domestic constraints in China and India on the deployment of coal, and geopolitical or technical constraints internationally on the supply of oil affect the trajectory of the variables discussed above.
The constraints on the development of coal and oil are assumed to occur through (i) an inability to deploy adequate capacity in time to meet the growing demand-leading to capacity shortages, and (ii) an increase in extraction costs (on the order of 20 percent plus). 45 These constraints are not transitional (as they were in 2004 in China) but structural-in the sense that they slowdown the pace of deployment of new capacity from 2010 up to 2050.
Country Implications
At the country level the results are significant-particularly for India, which is more constrained with respect to domestically available fossil fuel resources: GDP losses increase up to -8 percent by 2030 (relative to the BAU level) and stabilize at this value. The effects are much more moderate for China where GDP losses grow to -2 percent of the BAU level by 2020 and plateau at -2.5 percent of GDP from 2030 onwards. As a result, India's CO 2 emissions in 2050 are 6 percent lower than in the no friction case (3 percent for China), reflecting essentially a contraction of the economic activity while (final) energy intensity of GDP and its carbon content remained virtually the same. The losses arise from higher energy prices (including the impact of the price of coal on power) that propagate throughout the input-output matrix and affect both the profitability of energy-intensive sectors and the purchasing power of households. This results in a reallocation of investments across sectors (see box 5.1).
Global Implications
These constraints affect international energy prices significantly in the BAU-f scenario: in 15 years (from 2010 to 2025) world energy prices-oil and coal-peak at 15 percent above the BAU scenario, with coal reaching its peak more gradually than oil. Thereafter prices decline-a sign that economies are able to adapt to part of the increase-and stabilize around +5 percent for coal and +15 percent for oil.
This in turn affects world GDP (losses reaching -0.1 percent in 2050), total cumulative primary energy demand (-1.0 percent in the period 2001 to 2050), and total cumulative carbon emissions (-1.4 percent over the period). The carbon intensity of both GDP and energy demand decrease, primarily because the share of coal and oil in the primary energy mix drops sharply relative to other energy sources such as gas, renewables and nuclear.
ALT Policy Scenarios
Country Implications
The ALT/ policy scenarios result in a substantial reduction in energy use and CO 2 emissions 46 both China and India (tables 5.5a and 5.5b). The combined effect of measures acting on demand and measures acting on supply is much stronger than the affect of either set of measures alone. More importantly, their impact on reducing annual energy use and emissions generated increase over time with marginal effects on GDP.
correlated with bad surprises about the ultimate size or quality of resources, the acceptability obstacles for instance to exploitation of tar sands and shale oils, revision of official reserves, country risk and institutional instability, etc.). 46 And even more so for SO 2 emissions that have local consequences but are not cited in the tables above.
Box 5.1: How Do Higher Prices Arising from Rigidities and Friction Affect the Chinese and Indian Economies and the World Economy?
The basic mechanisms at play in the short term transmission of energy difficulties in China and India are shown in the diagram below.
First, domestically, higher energy prices adversely affect household purchasing power with a deflating impact on the economy (dynamically, the higher prices in the energy sector make it relatively more attractive at the expense of the more productive composite sector, thereby affecting domestic growth).
Second, internationally, the increase of the oil import bill (due to lower domestic supply of coal or nuclear energy, and/or higher international oil prices) worsens terms of trade. This lowers the activity losses in China and India, but transfers part of the impact to other regions. A lower growth rate is induced in most world regions through two channels: smaller total world market and change in terms of trade. In the scenario without frictions, the resulting overall impact of higher growth rates in China and India on other regions is roughly neutral, because the costs of higher oil prices for oil importing countries is compensated by the positive impact of larger markets in China and India.
How Shocks Propagate
Measuring the extent of energy and emissions decoupling from GDP growth:
KAYA diagrams are a convenient way of presenting the time profile of the extent to which the two decouplings mentioned earlier have been achieved. The horizontal axis shows the extent of improvement in energy intensity in an economy (i.e., energy used per unit of output) and is read going from right to left. The vertical axis shows the extent of improvement in carbon intensity [decarbonization] in the economy (i.e., carbon emitted per unit of energy) and is read going from top to bottom. In the KAYA diagrams presented below (see figure 5.13), the following alternatives are illustrated (and labeled): the BAU and BAU-f scenarios; the scenarios induced by measures acting on demand ALT-D and ALT-D-f; the scenarios induced by measures acting on supply ALT-S and ALT-S-f; and the scenarios induced by combining measures acting on supply and demand ALT-S&D and ALT-S&D-f. In all scenarios both for China and India there is a strong reduction in energy intensity. However, the business as usual strategy has carbon intensity increasing both in India and China-but more significantly in India. Neither shows any improvement in carbon intensity until the latter part of the 50 year period under review.
Measures to reduce demand only (by increasing energy efficiency) extend the extent to which energy intensity of GDP is reduced and ensure that carbon intensity does not grow as much as it does in the business as usual cases. But the time profile of the two decouplings is very similar to BAU cases in China and India. In China, demand-side policies, reduce emissions by 0.84GtC relative to the 3.6 GtC of emissions in 2050 (a 23 percent reduction). By contrast, in India demand-side policies reduce emissions by 0.27 GtC relative to 1.6 GtC in 2050 (i.e., by a substantial 17 percent because of the higher initial inefficiencies of energy use in the Indian economy?). 
ALT-S&D
Measures to only change supply (i.e., the structure of fuels supplied to the economy) do not extend the extent to which energy intensity of GDP is reduced (unlike the demand measures) in either China or India, however, in the case of China they do significantly alter the time profile and the extent to which the carbon intensity is reduced. In the case for India, after an initial shift away from carbon, carbon intensity starts increasing once again (unlike China) because the share of traditional biomass for household residential use is much higher at the outset of the process in India relative to China (48 percent versus 18 percent respectively). Thus, the greater shift from traditional biomass to commercial electricity for household residential use results in a displacement of less carbon emitting biomass by more fossil-fuel dependent electricity-despite the increased penetration of nuclear and nontraditional renewables such as wind and solar energy for the production of power. In China, supply-side policies reduce emissions from 3.6 GtC in 2050 in the BAU case to 2.88 GtC (another 20 percent reduction). In India, supply-side policies have a comparable effect as and China and bring down emissions by 0.37GtC in 2050 from 1.56GtC but the effect is less than demand side policies for the reasons mentioned above?
Combining measures to reduce demand and change the structure of supply result in both more reduction in energy intensity and more reduction in carbon intensity relative to either alone and significantly relative to the businesses usual case. The combined implementation of these measures reduces energy intensity of GDP by 24 percent in China and 17 percent in India relative to the BAU scenario, and carbon intensity of energy by 21 percent China and 25 percent for India relative to BAU scenario in 2050.
Global Implications
The repercussion of these ALT policy scenarios on world energy prices are mixed. The improvement in fuel efficiency of transport in China and India to this lower global oil prices by a couple of percent. The improved efficiency in coal use and the substitution towards nuclear and renewable fuels as substitutes in generating electricity has a more significant impact on world coal prices which drop by some 5 percent to 10 percent by 2050. This has a positive impact on India which may have to import some coal in the future. These effects are more pronounced in the scenarios with rigidity/friction.
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The ALT policy scenarios have a much more significant impact on emissions. The effect grows over time and extends beyond 2050. However, even by 2050 in cumulative terms, avoided CO 2 emissions from energy use in China total some 18GtC through demand-side policies and 21GtC through supply-side policies and 36 GtC as a result of a combination of supply-and demand-policies (to be compared to 116GtC cumulative CO 2 emissions in the baseline scenario). The overall impact of policies on CO 2 emissions in India is of similar relative magnitude. In cumulative terms, avoided CO 2 emissions from energy use in India total some 43GtC through demand-side policies and 11GtC through supply-side policies and 15 GtC for supply-and demand-policies (to be compared to 49GtC cumulative CO 2 emissions in the baseline scenario).
Scale of Additional Investment and Financing Requirements in ALT vs. BAU Scenarios
As noted earlier in the section on energy and emissions trajectories of ALT scenarios, implementing either demand or supply-side measures reduces energy and emissions relative to the BAU case. The measures do not offset each other, so implementing both sets of measures reduces energy and emissions substantially more than either alone. And this reduction continues throughout the period up to and beyond 2050. This is not the case for energy investments (see table 5.6).
Implementing measures to only reduce the demand for energy lowers investment requirements in all periods relative to the BAU case, whereas measures to only change the structure of fuel supply increases investment requirements substantially relative to the BAU case. However, combining the two sets of measures results in an intermediate time profile of investment requirements which in aggregate are higher than in the BAU case in the early period and lower in the later periods. Additional requirements for energy investments drop by 2050 (and in the case of China they drop to a level below its BAU equivalent). The reason for this is that a smaller amount of investment is required in fuel switching when demand is lower.
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A key point in this analysis, is the way it which capital flows are treated in the IMACLIM model, thereby affecting overall policy costs. The bulk of the simulations rely on the following assumptions: (i) decarbonization implies higher capital costs and higher consumer prices (at least during the transition period), (ii) in the case of China, the government maintains high capital outflows, to offset large revenues earned from very large exports of goods and services-a policy which is not in effect in India, (iii) the equations on capital balance in the model completely determine whether the additional costs of the energy systems will hamper growth or not: in the case of China, if capital exports remain high, and domestic investment stable, additional investment in the energy system crowds out investment in the other sectors. In the case of India, the need for additional investment is partly fulfilled by reducing capital exports, thereby avoiding the crowding-out effect, (iv) as a consequence of these critical assumptions on capital flows, (ALT) policies are more costly in China than in India. 
China Energy Investment (billion 2001 US$)
India Energy Investment (billion 2001 US$)
To explore this matter a simulation was run in which China exports less capital net (equivalent to receiving additional gross capital inflows to offset the same capital exports as in the BAU case). This enables China to allow additional domestic savings to flow into the energy sector thereby financing additional energy investments, without crowding out other investments, in a manner analogous to India.
Another scenario was simulated to explore the consequences of delaying interventions. From a country perspective, the higher initial cost of investment of alternatives to fossil fuels is a concern and therefore the standard response is to delay adopting cutting edge technologies till additional technological innovations reduce their costs 50 to avoid adversely affecting GDP growth rates. Delaying the implementation of policies will result in higher investment requirements in the future to reach a target emissions level by a specified period. These higher costs will represent a lower share of a larger GDP given the growth in the economy in the interim. However, the environmental benefits of these policies will show up later and never quite fully catch up with the benefits generated by earlier implementation of policies. Thus both the costs of investment and the benefits of emissions reduction are shifted into the future. As an example, in the scenario with rigidities (f), ALT-S&D interventions are cost effective relative to BAU at a carbon price of US$5/tCO 2 in 2020 and US$6.7/tCO 2 in 2050 in China (and US$7.8/tCO 2 in 2020 and US$10.5/tCO 2 in 2050 in India). That is, the ALT intervention becomes cost effective at carbon prices today of US$4.3/tCO 2 in China (and US$6.7/tCO 2 in India) calculated for a discount rate into 8 percent per annum-which is well below the US$11-12/tCO 2 actually prevailing in the 1st quarter of 2006 on the project-based segment of the carbon market. With delayed action (by a decade), a higher price of carbon is needed today to generate the same returns. This carbon price will be above current prices, especially for India. As a result, the cumulative 'financial cost reducing' benefit of delaying investments doe not offset the increased cumulative emissions cost associated with prolonged reliance on fossil fuels. 51 Finally, in contrast to the scenarios in the ALT reference cases, in the high growth rate variants, enough savings are generated (particularly in China, less so in India) to self finance the higher cost of investment in energy efficiency and the shift away from carbon based fuels. However, even in the high growth rate scenarios, when rigidities in local and global energy markets are introduced into the scenarios, some external financing is required if growth rates are not to be adversely affected in China and India. This external financing is justified from a global efficiency perspective because-in contrast to mature economies in the industrial countries where there is a large capital stock or where firms are operating at their production frontiers-the benefit/cost ratio of more expensive clean/low carbon energy investments in China and India is higher since there are multiple, joint benefits (local and global emissions reductions), and many sectors are currently operating within their production frontiers. In addition, investment costs will be lower for the new capital formation in China and India which will be taking place now, than for retrofitting old/aging capital or prematurely retiring them 52 whether in China and India, or in industrial countries.
Conclusions
The findings in this paper regarding some general concerns expressed about China and India's growth and reliance on fossil fuel energies can be summarized as follows:
• Energy externalities (local, regional and global) are likely to worsen significantly if there is no shift in China and India's energy strategy. This proposition is confirmed. Local and global emissions are higher 1. in the high GDP growth rate scenarios relative to the low BAU GDP growth rate scenarios;
2. for the scenario in which there are adjustment costs (friction) relative to the scenario in which there are no adjustment costs;
3. for both of the BAU scenarios relative to all the ALT scenarios; and
• Many countries in the developing world (as well as immediate neighbors of China and India) worry that high energy demand from China and India will hurt their growth via higher prices on international energy markets. This proposition is also confirmed but with a caveat: In some scenarios, and for some groups of countries, the 'growth retarding' effects of higher energy prices are partially or fully offset by the 'growth stimulating' effects of the larger markets in China and India.
• China and India themselves worry that shifting their energy strategy to lower emissions fuels will reduce externalities and the pressure on energy prices in world energy markets-but at the expense of growth in China and India.
To the extent that energy is a complementary input in the production of GDP, then any restriction on the use of energy will of necessity affect the rate of growth of GDP. Given, however, that there are a lot of inefficiencies in the energy system in both China and India, then in principle there is an opportunity to reduce energy growth without adversely affecting GDP growth. Some of the more energy-efficient options are competitive cost wise with current inefficient energy options. So these are likely to be adopted through standard market forces and incentives where there is competition. However, many other energy efficient options are more costly and likely to crowd out investments outside the energy sector thereby slowing down growth. This will occur particularly when domestic savings and finances are limited.
To the extent, that in China, and to a lesser extent in India, domestic savings continues to exceed domestic investment this constraint is less binding, provided countries have the option to redeploy savings (that are currently exported) to domestic investment into more costly energyefficient technologies. Comparing comparable scenarios suggests that (i) the adoption of energy efficiency options, and (ii) the shift to low or no carbon fuels will not cause a slowdown in the growth rate of China and India.
• The cost of a decarbonizing energy strategy will be higher for China and India than a fossil fuel based strategy. However, it can be self financed (i) without additional transfers from developed countries, and (ii) without compromising growth in China or India. Growth globally may decline a bit but the amount in quantitative terms is likely to be insignificant.
The magnitude of the overall economic costs of decarbonizing energy strategies by comparison with a fossil fuel based development pathway for China and India are very sensitive to:
1. the content of the baseline: (i) the degree of optimism about the domestic capacity to develop the coal supply fast enough and (ii) the prospects for oil price increments in the baseline scenario.
2. the degree of technical optimism regarding the potential for demand and supply policies.
3. the macro economic context of the deployment of these strategies, in particular policies linked to external capital flows.
the time horizon.
The general message is that over a long time horizon (in a century) it is possible to define decarbonizing strategies which do not compromise growth in either country. However, in all cases transition difficulties are experienced, between a few years and several decades (30 years max). Additional financing is necessary to cope with these transitions difficulties, and they may come either from a change in macro-economic policies (less capital exports, consistent with higher terms of trade and lower good exports) or new funds provided by new sources of public/external capital or carbon trading system. Finally, the paper has shown that growth rates are lower in the scenarios with friction compared to the reference cases in both the business as usual (BAU) and policy alternative (ALT) scenarios. The scenarios with friction are probably more realistic than the scenarios without friction. The ALT scenarios are more robust when there is friction (surprises and adjustment costs) than when there is no friction. To that extent, the ALT scenarios which presumes more investment in energy and emissions efficiency technology, will provide an additional dividend in terms of energy security. This is particularly important for India, given its greater dependence on imports for oil, gas, and high-quality coal.
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